The Biological Dangers of Migration
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If we first establish what migration is, we must understand the significance of the flight from the land and its relationship to migration. Flight from the land has become a common term and, among population policymakers, a subject of justified concern for the future of our people. The migration inherent in the flight from the land and the associated, ever-advancing urbanisation of the German people has occupied all authorities responsible for this area for years now.

In a few words, and by no means exhaustively, one can assert that the main causes of the flight from the land are conditioned by the structural imbalance of farm sizes in our agriculture on the one hand, and on the other hand by the ideological orientation of our national comrades.

It becomes evident that the flight from the land primarily threatens second and third sons and daughters of farmers, who in the meantime have no prospect of becoming independent farmers or of finding employment in agriculture. Due to the departure of the second and subsequent sons, the marriage prospects for daughters naturally diminish. The prospect of becoming agricultural labourers is slight given the relatively small entailed estates, and so there is no alternative but to move to the city, where boys have employment opportunities through agencies, have free time in prospect, and can expect better wages, and where girls obtain well-paying — or at least better-paying — positions, can perform lighter work, and perhaps also have more opportunities for social contact than the countryside can offer.

Thus far, the facts instruct us. It becomes different, of course, when we ask for the ideologically based reasons. The flight from the land decisively sets in only at the moment when the liberal-democratic "right to a life" is propagated into the most remote village, and the farm boy and maid are made to understand that an easier and more comfortable life is to be expected in the city, and that no one there has to work with animals or in the stable from morning until evening. After the prescribed working hours, the city still offers at least six more hours in which one is one's own master and over which no one else has control.

We know precisely that some moved to the city to work and to get ahead. But unfortunately, too many stayed in the city who learned to "enjoy life" and did not realise that they came from families with many children and now themselves have a negative impact through childlessness.

What makes the flight from the land particularly and dangerously threatening from a population policy perspective in recent years is its convergence with the unchecked decline in births in rural communities. Although numerically the rural population still has more children than the urban population today, in rural areas 50% fewer children are already being born than was the case 20 years ago.

The healthy egoism inherent in the flight from the land, however, has its disadvantages in terms of combating it. The farming class, the lifeblood of our people, has long been overstrained beyond its capacity by the city and its allure, and the pernicious, self-centred outlook on life has had a devastating effect on birth control.

From a completely different perspective, however, the mostly identical questions arise with migration. Its danger is still not widely known today, especially since concrete data is available only in the rarest of cases.

The reasons for migration lie, on the one hand, in an economic structure that does not align with the population policy situation at all, or in an uneven pattern of development, where in one area a need for workplaces arises due to lagging economic change and an excess supply of labour, while in another rapidly developing area a demand for workplaces emerges. Migration is determined by the possibility of work in another area; thus, unlike flight from the land, it is not driven by a "right to a life," but rather by a "right to work". Furthermore, for migration, the determining factor is not a lack of space, but a lack of work. Available jobs determine migration. And with that, the ideological aspect of this question is answered simultaneously with the economic one. Here we do not have a self-deception in pursuit of a more pleasant life, but rather a drive for work and likewise a need for advancement. The goal is not necessarily the city, but rather the industrial workplace.

Thus, the essential difference has already been established: flight from the land occurs predominantly from agricultural areas to the cities; migration occurs only from industrially and commercially determined areas and is directed toward receptive and expandable industrial areas.

It is merely a coincidence conditioned by our economic geography that, within German territory, with the possible exception of the industrial areas located in the East, the direction of both flight from the land and migration is predominantly East-West. In both cases, the East is depleted, and the centre (and the West) are populated (and, if this continues, also overpopulated) through immigration and migration.

Despite the differences shown, the affected areas lose the racially extremely valuable and therefore indispensable part of their population for maintaining their numbers: in flight from the land, it is the healthy peasant strength; in migration, it is the efficient skilled worker, so essential for the economic development of precisely those areas.

When delineating these two concepts, one must not set overly narrow boundaries. Only the general direction can be established here. The denser an area is populated, the greater the necessity for urbanisation becomes. In these cases, flight from the land and migration merge into a clearly emerging lack of space.

These shifts of a population policy nature are tolerable as long as they occur within limited areas. However, they become a population policy danger when they deplete entire parts of the Reich. This occurs when economic security of existence can no longer keep pace with the quantitative and qualitative population development and the rise in living standards.

The resulting dissonances then become a spiral without end. Because firstly, migration reduces the purely numerical density of the affected area; secondly, it undeniably loses a racially valuable part; thirdly, there is a lack of workplaces for reconstruction; furthermore, it leads to the induction and spread of products, which can be attributed to the migration of workplaces. A statistic based solely on unemployment figures

and not taking migration into account not only provides an incorrect picture of the economic situation, but also overlooks the biological situation of the working-age cohorts in the affected area, insofar as the strength of migration among the younger age groups must manifest as a lack of new growth.

Therefore, intervention is necessary now, before the borderland is emptied of all people capable of deployment and development. It is a sign of an impending catastrophe when, for example, in some eastern districts of the Grenzmark [border region], almost no suitable men can be found for local group leader or mayor positions. Long enough has the German East been the stepchild of the economy and, until the last few years perhaps, also the stepchild of the state. This applies not only to the Grenzmark and Silesia, but also to Saxony and the Bavarian Ostmark [Eastern border]. It is high time to recognise that the fate of the Reich is determined not in the centre, but on its most endangered flanks, on its border in the East. The areas in the East, depleted by flight from the land and migration, are being pressured by the high birth rates of our East Slavic neighbours in the eastern states, especially Poland and, behind it, Russia.

The red line on the map alone does not guarantee our borders; if twice as many people live on the Polish western border as on our eastern border, then this imbalance will one day have to find its balance. But it is our own affair that this balance does not occur in a few decades from the side of our neighbours through strong infiltration and, as a consequence, through border shifts, but rather that it comes about through the prevention of migration from the eastern territories of the Reich, through the increase in the birth rate in general, and through the creation of as many existence-securing economic opportunities as possible on our eastern border.

What is lost through flight from the land and migration is a loss that can be described as almost 100% permanent. The national comrades lost to the borderland through flight from the land and migration are, in terms of age, the biologically most capable forces, for among them those aged 20 to 24 are most strongly represented, and they are almost without exception unmarried. Thus, with each migrant who leaves, the loss extends beyond the individual to include their unrealised descendants, whose lives and contributions will unfold not in the border region but elsewhere, constituting an irreplaceable demographic loss.

A borderland is only fortified when it is inhabited by people. And capable people can only live in a borderland if they have the opportunity for livelihood and advancement there.